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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT TACOMA

DONNA BRIM, on behalf of herself  
individually and on behalf of all others  
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

PRESTIGE CARE, INC.,

Defendant.

Cause No.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

**INTRODUCTION**

Plaintiff Donna Brim (“Plaintiff”) brings this Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendant Prestige Care, Inc. (“Prestige” or “Defendant”) as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and alleges, upon personal knowledge as to her own actions and her counsels’ investigation, and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:

**NATURE OF THE ACTION**

1. This class action arises out of the recent data breach (“Data Breach”) involving Defendant, a healthcare corporation that provides skilled nursing, assisted living, and independent

1 living services to its customers in “Oregon, Washington, California, Nevada, Arizona, Idaho,  
2 Alaska & Montana.”<sup>1</sup>

3           2. Plaintiff brings this Complaint against Defendant for its failure to properly secure  
4 and safeguard the sensitive information that it collected and maintained as part of its regular  
5 business practices, including, but not limited to: names, Social Security numbers (“personally  
6 identifying information” or “PII”) and medical and health insurance information, which is  
7 protected health information (“PHI,” and collectively with Private Information, “Private  
8 Information”) as defined by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996  
9 (“HIPAA”).  
10

11           3. Former and current Prestige residents and employees are required to entrust  
12 Defendant with sensitive, non-public Private Information, without which Defendant could not  
13 perform its regular business activities, in order to obtain employment or services from Prestige.  
14 Defendant retains this information for at least many years, even after its relationship with a resident  
15 or employee has ended.  
16

17           4. By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from the Private Information  
18 of Plaintiff and Class Members, Defendant assumed legal and equitable duties to those individuals  
19 to protect and safeguard that information from unauthorized access and intrusion.  
20

21           5. “On August 26, 2023, Prestige experienced a network security incident that  
22 involved an unauthorized party gaining access to [its] network environment.”<sup>2</sup> Defendant  
23 subsequently “engaged a specialized third-party forensic incident response firm to assist with  
24

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>1</sup> <https://www.prestigecare.com/about-prestige/>

27 <sup>2</sup> The “Notice Letter”. A sample copy is available at  
28 <https://apps.web.maine.gov/online/aeviewer/ME/40/d71b6f68-8cda-420e-a064-64a3ae3dc47c.shtml>

1 securing the network environment and investigating the extent of unauthorized activity.”<sup>3</sup> As a  
2 result of its investigation, Prestige concluded, on an undisclosed date, that “an unauthorized third  
3 party may have accessed certain personal information during this incident.”<sup>4</sup>

4           6. According to Defendant’s Notice of a Data Incident letter (the “Notice Letter”), the  
5 compromised Private Information included individuals’ names, addresses, dates of birth, Social  
6 Security numbers, medical record numbers, health insurance policy numbers, and information  
7 about individuals’ medical histories, mental and/or physical conditions, and/or medical diagnoses  
8 or treatments.<sup>5</sup>

9  
10           7. According to Defendant’s reporting, the Private Information of approximately  
11 38,000 individuals was compromised in the Data Breach.<sup>6</sup>

12           8. Defendant failed to adequately protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private  
13 Information—and failed to even encrypt or redact this highly sensitive information. This  
14 unencrypted, unredacted Private Information was compromised due to Defendant’s negligent  
15 and/or careless acts and omissions and its utter failure to protect residents’ and employees’  
16 sensitive data. Hackers targeted and obtained Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information  
17 because of its value in exploiting and stealing the identities of Plaintiff and Class Members. The  
18 present and continuing risk to victims of the Data Breach will remain for their respective lifetimes.  
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24 <sup>3</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>4</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>5</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>6</sup> According to the breach report submitted to the Office of the Maine Attorney General, 38,087  
28 persons were impacted in the Data Breach. See <https://apps.web.maine.gov/online/aewiewer/ME/40/d71b6f68-8cda-420e-a064-64a3ae3dc47c.shtml>

1 9. Since the Data Breach started, Plaintiff and Class Members were unaware that their  
2 sensitive Private Information had been compromised, and that they were, and continue to be, at  
3 significant risk of identity theft and various other forms of personal, social, and financial harm.

4 10. In breaching its duties to properly safeguard its residents' and employees' Private  
5 Information and give them timely, adequate notice of the Data Breach, Defendant was negligent  
6 and/or reckless in violation of federal and state statutes.

7 11. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all persons whose Private Information was  
8 compromised as a result of Defendant's failure to: (i) adequately protect the Private Information  
9 of Plaintiff and Class Members; (ii) warn Plaintiff and Class Members of Defendant's inadequate  
10 information security practices; and (iii) effectively secure hardware containing protected Private  
11 Information using reasonable and effective security procedures. Defendant's conduct amounts at  
12 least to negligence and violates federal and state statutes.

13 12. Defendant disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members by intentionally,  
14 willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to implement and maintain adequate and reasonable  
15 measures to ensure that the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members was safeguarded,  
16 failing to take available steps to prevent an unauthorized disclosure of data, and failing to follow  
17 applicable, required, and appropriate protocols, policies, and procedures regarding the encryption  
18 of data, even for internal use. As a result, the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members  
19 was compromised through disclosure to an unknown and unauthorized third party. Plaintiff and  
20 Class Members have a continuing interest in ensuring that their information is and remains safe,  
21 and are entitled to injunctive and other equitable relief.

22 13. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered injuries as a result of Defendant's  
23 conduct. These injuries include: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of their Private Information; (iii)  
24

1 lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated  
2 with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the  
3 bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences  
4 of the Data Breach; (vii) statutory damages; (viii) nominal damages; and (ix) the continued and  
5 certainly increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available  
6 for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant's  
7 possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to  
8 undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.  
9

10 14. Plaintiff and Class Members seek to remedy these harms and prevent any future  
11 data compromise on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons whose personal data  
12 was compromised and stolen as a result of the Data Breach and who remain at risk due to  
13 Defendant's inadequate data security practices.  
14

15 **PARTIES**

16 15. Plaintiff Donna Brim is and has been, at all relevant times, a resident and citizen of  
17 Molalla, Oregon.

18 16. Defendant Prestige Care, Inc. is a healthcare corporation incorporated under the  
19 state laws of Washington, with its principal place of business located in Vancouver, Washington.  
20

21 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

22 17. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under the Class Action  
23 Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million, exclusive of  
24 interest and costs. The number of class members is over 100, many of whom reside outside the  
25 state of Washington and have different citizenship from Defendant, including Plaintiff. Thus,  
26 minimal diversity exists under 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A)  
27  
28

1 18. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant operates and  
2 maintains its principal place of business in this District.

3 19. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) because Defendant’s  
4 principal place of businesses is located in this District, a substantial part of the events giving rise  
5 to this action occurred in this District, and Defendant has harmed Class Members residing in this  
6 District.  
7

8 **BACKGROUND**

9 ***Defendant's Business***

10 20. Defendant is a healthcare corporation that provides skilled nursing, assisted living,  
11 and independent living services to its customers in “Oregon, Washington, California, Nevada,  
12 Arizona, Idaho, Alaska & Montana.”<sup>7</sup>

13 21. Plaintiff and Class Members are current and former Prestige residents and/or  
14 employees.  
15

16 22. In order to obtain employment or residency at Prestige, Plaintiff and Class Members  
17 were required to provide Prestige with sensitive and confidential Private Information, including  
18 their names, Social Security number, and health information.

19 23. The information held by Defendant in its computer systems included the  
20 unencrypted Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members.  
21

22 24. Upon information and belief, Defendant made promises and representations to its  
23 residents and employees, including Plaintiff and Class Members, that the Private Information  
24 collected from them as a condition of obtaining employment at Prestige would be kept safe and  
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<sup>7</sup> <https://www.prestigecare.com/about-prestige/>  
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1 confidential, that the privacy of that information would be maintained, and that Defendant would  
2 delete any sensitive information after it was no longer required to maintain it.

3 25. Indeed, Defendant provides on its website that: “[a]t Prestige Care Inc. . . . we take  
4 your privacy seriously.”

5 26. Plaintiff and Class Members provided their Private Information to Defendant with  
6 the reasonable expectation and mutual understanding that Defendant would comply with its  
7 obligations to keep such information confidential and secure from unauthorized access.  
8

9 27. Plaintiff and the Class Members have taken reasonable steps to maintain the  
10 confidentiality of their Private Information. Plaintiff and Class Members relied on Defendant’s  
11 sophistication to keep their Private Information confidential and securely maintained, to use this  
12 information for necessary purposes only, and to make only authorized disclosures of this  
13 information. Plaintiff and Class Members value the confidentiality of their Private Information and  
14 demand security to safeguard their Private Information.  
15

16 28. Defendant had a duty to adopt reasonable measures to protect the Private  
17 Information of Plaintiff and Class Members from involuntary disclosure to third parties. Defendant  
18 has a legal duty to keep its residents’ and employees’ Private Information safe and confidential.

19 29. Defendant had obligations under the FTC Act, HIPAA, contract, and industry  
20 standards to keep Plaintiff and Class Members’ Private Information confidential and to protect it  
21 from unauthorized access and disclosure.  
22

23 30. Defendant derived a substantial economic benefit from collecting Plaintiff’s and  
24 Class Members’ Private Information. Without that Private Information, Defendant could not  
25 perform the services it provides.  
26  
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1 31. By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from Plaintiff’s and Class  
2 Members’ Private Information, Defendant assumed legal and equitable duties to Plaintiff and Class  
3 Members, and it knew or should have known that it was responsible for protecting Plaintiff’s and  
4 Class Members’ Private Information from disclosure.

5 ***The Data Breach***

6  
7 32. On or about January 31, 2024, Defendant began sending Plaintiff and other victims  
8 of the Data Breach a Notice of a Security Incident letter, informing them that:

9 **What Happened?** On or around September 7, 2023, Prestige Care became aware of  
10 suspicious activity on our computer network. Prestige Care launched an investigation and  
11 determined that our network had been infected with malware, which prevented access to  
12 certain files on the system. Through our investigation, we determined that, an unauthorized  
13 actor may have had access to certain systems that stored personal and health information  
14 on September 7, 2023. Prestige Care is undertaking an extensive and time intensive review  
15 of what information was potentially impacted and to whom that information relates. On  
16 December 18, 2023, Prestige Care determined that information related to certain current  
17 former employees and residents was present in its systems. Although we have no evidence  
18 of any identity theft or fraud in connection with this incident, Prestige Care began providing  
19 notice to those individuals whose information was present in its systems.

20 **What Information Was Involved?** Our investigation determined the following types of  
21 your information may have been impacted by this incident: Social Security number, health  
22 insurance information, and medical information, and your name.<sup>8</sup>

23 33. Omitted from the Notice Letter were the dates of the Data Breach, the dates of  
24 Defendant’s investigation, the details of the root cause of the Data Breach, the vulnerabilities  
25 exploited, any explanation as to why it took Defendant more than two months after the Data Breach  
26 to inform impacted individuals of the Data Breach, and the remedial measures undertaken to ensure  
27 such a breach does not occur again. To date, these critical facts have not been explained or clarified  
28 to Plaintiff and Class Members, who retain a vested interest in ensuring that their Private  
Information remains protected.

8 Notice Letter.

1           34.     This “disclosure” amounts to no real disclosure at all, as it fails to inform, with any  
2 degree of specificity, Plaintiff and Class Members of the Data Breach’s critical facts. Without  
3 these details, Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ ability to mitigate the harms resulting from the Data  
4 Breach is severely diminished.

5           35.     Defendant did not use reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to  
6 the nature of the sensitive information it was maintaining for Plaintiff and Class Members, , such  
7 as encrypting the information or deleting it when it is no longer needed, causing the exposure of  
8 Private Information.

9           36.     The attacker accessed and acquired files in Defendant’s computer systems  
10 containing unencrypted Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, including their names,  
11 Social Security numbers, health insurance information, and medical information. Plaintiff’s and  
12 Class Members’ Private Information was accessed and stolen in the Data Breach.

13           37.     Plaintiff further believes that her Private Information and that of Class Members  
14 was or will be sold on the dark web, as that is the *modus operandi* of cybercriminals that commit  
15 cyber-attacks of this type.

16                   ***Data Breaches Are Preventable***

17           38.     As explained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “[p]revention is the most  
18 effective defense against ransomware and it is critical to take precautions for protection.”<sup>9</sup>

19           39.     To prevent and detect cyber-attacks and/or ransomware attacks Defendant could  
20 and should have implemented, as recommended by the United States Government, the following  
21 measures:  
22  
23  
24

25  
26  
27 <sup>9</sup> See How to Protect Your Networks from RANSOMWARE at 3, available at  
28 <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ransomware-prevention-and-response-for-cisos.pdf/view>.

- 1 ● Implement an awareness and training program. Because end users are targets,  
2 employees and individuals should be aware of the threat of ransomware and how it  
3 is delivered.
- 4 ● Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end users  
5 and authenticate inbound email using technologies like Sender Policy Framework  
6 (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC),  
7 and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent email spoofing.
- 8 ● Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable files  
9 from reaching end users.
- 10 ● Configure firewalls to block access to known malicious IP addresses.
- 11 ● Patch operating systems, software, and firmware on devices. Consider using a  
12 centralized patch management system.
- 13 ● Set anti-virus and anti-malware programs to conduct regular scans automatically.
- 14 ● Manage the use of privileged accounts based on the principle of least privilege: no  
15 users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely needed; and those  
16 with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when necessary.
- 17 ● Configure access controls—including file, directory, and network share  
18 permissions—with least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific files,  
19 the user should not have written access to those files, directories, or shares.
- 20 ● Disable macro scripts from office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office  
21 Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full  
22 office suite applications.
- 23 ● Implement Software Restriction Policies (SRP) or other controls to prevent  
24 programs from executing from common ransomware locations, such as temporary  
25 folders supporting popular Internet browsers or compression/decompression  
26 programs, including the AppData/LocalAppData folder.
- 27 ● Consider disabling Remote Desktop protocol (RDP) if it is not being used.
- 28 ● Use application whitelisting, which only allows systems to execute programs  
known and permitted by security policy.
- Execute operating system environments or specific programs in a virtualized  
environment.

- Categorize data based on organizational value and implement physical and logical separation of networks and data for different organizational units.<sup>10</sup>

40. To prevent and detect cyber-attacks or ransomware attacks Prestige could and should have implemented, as recommended by the Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team, the following measures:

**Secure internet-facing assets**

- Apply latest security updates
- Use threat and vulnerability management
- Perform regular audit; remove privileged credentials;

**Thoroughly investigate and remediate alerts**

- Prioritize and treat commodity malware infections as potential full compromise;

**Include IT Pros in security discussions**

- Ensure collaboration among [security operations], [security admins], and [information technology] admins to configure servers and other endpoints securely;

**Build credential hygiene**

- Use [multifactor authentication] or [network level authentication] and use strong, randomized, just-in-time local admin passwords;

**Apply principle of least-privilege**

- Monitor for adversarial activities
- Hunt for brute force attempts
- Monitor for cleanup of Event Logs
- Analyze logon events;

**Harden infrastructure**

- Use Windows Defender Firewall
- Enable tamper protection
- Enable cloud-delivered protection

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<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 3–4.

1 - Turn on attack surface reduction rules and [Antimalware Scan  
2 Interface] for Office[Visual Basic for Applications].<sup>11</sup>

3 41. Given that Defendant was storing the sensitive Private Information of its current  
4 and former residents, Defendant could and should have implemented all of the above measures to  
5 prevent and detect cyberattacks.

6 42. The occurrence of the Data Breach indicates that Defendant failed to adequately  
7 implement one or more of the above measures, resulting in the Data Breach and the exposure of  
8 the Private Information of more than thirty thousand individuals, including that of Plaintiff and  
9 Class Members.  
10

11 ***Defendant Acquires, Collects, and Stores Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private  
12 Information***

13 43.

14 44. Defendant could have prevented this Data Breach by properly securing and  
15 encrypting the files and file servers containing the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class  
16 Members.

17 45. Defendant's negligence in safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiff and  
18 Class Members is exacerbated by the repeated warnings and alerts directed to protecting and  
19 securing sensitive data.  
20

21 ***Defendant Knew, Or Should Have Known, of the Risk of a Data Breach Because  
22 Healthcare Entities In Possession of Private Information Are Particularly Susceptible.***

23 46. Data thieves regularly target companies like Defendant due to the highly sensitive  
24 information that they custody. Defendant knew and understood that unprotected Private  
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26 <sup>11</sup> See Human-operated ransomware attacks: A preventable disaster (Mar 5, 2020), available at:  
27 [https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-  
28 preventable-disaster/](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/).

1 Information is valuable and highly sought after by criminal parties who seek to illegally monetize  
2 that Private Information through unauthorized access.

3 47. Defendant's data security obligations were particularly important given the  
4 substantial increase in cyber-attacks and/or data breaches targeting entities that collect and store  
5 Private Information and other sensitive information, like Defendant, before the Breach.

6 48. In the third quarter of the 2023 fiscal year alone, 7,333 organizations experienced  
7 data breaches, resulting in 66,658,764 individuals' personal information being compromised.<sup>12</sup>

8 49. In light of recent high profile cybersecurity incidents at other healthcare partner and  
9 provider companies, including American Medical Collection Agency (25 million residents, March  
10 2019), University of Washington Medicine (974,000 residents, December 2018), Florida  
11 Orthopedic Institute (640,000 residents, July 2020), Wolverine Solutions Group (600,000  
12 residents, September 2018), Oregon Department of Human Services (645,000 residents, March  
13 2019), Elite Emergency Physicians (550,000 residents, June 2020), Magellan Health (365,000  
14 residents, April 2020), and BJC Health System (286,876 residents, March 2020), Defendant knew  
15 or should have known that its electronic records would be targeted by cybercriminals.  
16

17 50. As a custodian of Private Information, Defendant knew, or should have known, the  
18 importance of safeguarding the Private Information entrusted to it by Plaintiff and Class members,  
19 and of the foreseeable consequences if its data security systems were breached, including the  
20 significant costs imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members as a result of a breach.  
21

22 51. Despite the prevalence of public announcements of data breach and data security  
23 compromises, Defendant failed to take appropriate steps to protect the Private Information of  
24 Plaintiff and Class Members from being compromised.  
25

26  
27 <sup>12</sup> See <https://www.idtheftcenter.org/publication/q3-data-breach-2023-analysis/> (last accessed Oct.  
28 11, 2023).

1 52. Indeed, cyber-attacks, such as the one experienced by Defendant, have become so  
2 notorious that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and U.S. Secret Service have issued a  
3 warning to potential targets so they are aware of, and prepared for, a potential attack. As one report  
4 explained, smaller entities that store Private Information are “attractive to ransomware criminals  
5 . . . because they often have lesser IT defenses and a high incentive to regain access to their data  
6 quickly.”<sup>13</sup>  
7

8 53. Additionally, as companies became more dependent on computer systems to run  
9 their business,<sup>14</sup> e.g., working remotely as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the Internet of  
10 Things (“IoT”), the danger posed by cybercriminals is magnified, thereby highlighting the need  
11 for adequate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards.<sup>15</sup>  
12

13 54. At all relevant times, Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the  
14 importance of safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members and of the  
15 foreseeable consequences that would occur if Defendant's data security system was breached,  
16 including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members  
17 as a result of a breach.

18 55. Defendant was, or should have been, fully aware of the unique type and the  
19 significant volume of data on Defendant's server(s), amounting to over thirty thousand individuals'  
20 detailed Private Information, and, thus, the significant number of individuals who would be  
21 harmed by the exposure of the unencrypted data.  
22

23 <sup>13</sup> [https://www.law360.com/consumerprotection/articles/1220974/fbi-secret-service-warn-of-targeted-ransomware?nl\\_pk=3ed44a08-fcc2-4b6c-89f0-aa0155a8bb51&utm\\_source=newsletter&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=consumerprotection](https://www.law360.com/consumerprotection/articles/1220974/fbi-secret-service-warn-of-targeted-ransomware?nl_pk=3ed44a08-fcc2-4b6c-89f0-aa0155a8bb51&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=consumerprotection).  
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26 <sup>14</sup> <https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/implications-of-cyber-risk-for-financial-stability-20220512.html>

27 <sup>15</sup> <https://www.picussecurity.com/key-threats-and-cyber-risks-facing-financial-services-and-banking-firms-in-2022>  
28

1 56. The injuries to Plaintiff and Class Members were directly and proximately caused  
2 by Defendant’s failure to implement or maintain adequate data security measures for the Private  
3 Information of Plaintiff and Class Members.

4 57. The ramifications of Defendant’s failure to keep secure the Private Information of  
5 Plaintiff and Class Members are long lasting and severe. Once Private Information is stolen—  
6 particularly Social Security numbers and PHI—fraudulent use of that information and damage to  
7 victims may continue for years.

8 58. As a healthcare entity in possession of its current and former residents’ and  
9 employees’ Private Information, Defendant knew, or should have known, the importance of  
10 safeguarding the Private Information entrusted to them by Plaintiff and Class Members and of the  
11 foreseeable consequences if its data security systems were breached. This includes the significant  
12 costs imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members as a result of a breach. Nevertheless, Defendant  
13 failed to take adequate cybersecurity measures to prevent the Data Breach.  
14

15  
16 ***Value of Private Information***

17 59. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) defines identity theft as “a fraud  
18 committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person without authority.”<sup>16</sup>  
19 The FTC describes “identifying information” as “any name or number that may be used, alone or  
20 in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person,” including, among other  
21 things, “[n]ame, Social Security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s  
22 license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number,  
23 employer or taxpayer identification number.”<sup>17</sup>  
24  
25  
26

27 <sup>16</sup> 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 (2013).

28 <sup>17</sup> *Id.*

1           60.     The PII of individuals remains of high value to criminals, as evidenced by the  
2 prices they will pay through the dark web. Numerous sources cite dark web pricing for stolen  
3 identity credentials.<sup>18</sup>

4           61.     For example, Personal Information can be sold at a price ranging from \$40 to  
5 \$200.<sup>19</sup>

6           62.     Criminals can also purchase access to entire company data breaches from \$900 to  
7 \$4,500.<sup>20</sup>

8           63.     PII can sell for as much as \$363 per record according to the Infosec Institute.<sup>21</sup> PII  
9 is particularly valuable because criminals can use it to target victims with frauds and scams.

10           64.     Theft of PHI is gravely serious: a thief may use your “name, Social Security  
11 number, health insurance account number, or Medicare number[]to see a doctor, get prescription  
12 drugs, buy medical devices, submit claims with your insurance provider, or get other medical care.  
13 If the thief’s health information is mixed with yours, it could affect the medical care you’re able  
14 to get or the health insurance benefits you’re able to use. It could also hurt your credit.”<sup>22</sup>  
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21 <sup>18</sup> Anita George, *Your personal data is for sale on the dark web. Here’s how much it costs*, Digital  
22 Trends (Oct. 16, 2019), available at [https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/personal-data-sold-](https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/personal-data-sold-on-the-dark-web-how-much-it-costs/)  
23 [on-the-dark-web-how-much-it-costs/](https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/personal-data-sold-on-the-dark-web-how-much-it-costs/).

24 <sup>19</sup> Brian Stack, *Here’s How Much Your Personal Information Is Selling for on the Dark Web*,  
25 Experian (Dec. 6, 2017), available at [https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-](https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-web/)  
26 [much-your-personal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-web/](https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-web/).

27 <sup>20</sup> *In the Dark*, VPNOverview, available at [https://vpnoverview.com/privacy/anonymous-](https://vpnoverview.com/privacy/anonymous-browsing/in-the-dark/)  
28 [browsing/in-the-dark/](https://vpnoverview.com/privacy/anonymous-browsing/in-the-dark/).

<sup>21</sup> See Ashiq Ja, *Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market*, InfoSec (July 27, 2015),  
<https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/>  
(last visited Sept. 5, 2023).

<sup>22</sup> *What To Know About Medical Identity Theft*, Federal Trade Commission (May 2021), available  
at <https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-know-about-medical-identity-theft>.

1           65. According to account monitoring company LogDog, medical data sells for \$50 and  
2 up on the Dark Web.<sup>23</sup>

3           66. The information compromised in the Data Breach is significantly more valuable  
4 than the loss of, for example, credit card information in a retailer data breach because, there,  
5 victims can cancel or close credit and debit card accounts. The information compromised in this  
6 Data Breach is impossible to “close” and difficult, if not impossible, to change—name, Social  
7 Security number, and PHI.  
8

9           67. This data demands a much higher price on the black market. Martin Walter, senior  
10 director at cybersecurity firm RedSeal, explained, “Compared to credit card information,  
11 personally identifiable information . . . [is] worth more than 10x on the black market.”<sup>24</sup>  
12

13           68. Among other forms of fraud, identity thieves may obtain driver’s licenses,  
14 government benefits, medical services, and housing or even give false information to police.

15           69. The fraudulent activity resulting from the Data Breach may not come to light for  
16 years. There may be a time lag between when harm occurs versus when it is discovered, and also  
17 between when Private Information is stolen and when it is used. According to the U.S. Government  
18 Accountability Office (“GAO”), which conducted a study regarding data breaches:

19           [L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be held for  
20 up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen  
21 data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may  
22  
23

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>23</sup> Lisa Vaas, *Ransomware Attacks Paralyze, and Sometimes Crush, Hospitals*, Naked Security  
26 (Oct. 3, 2019), <https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/10/03/ransomware-attacks-paralyze-and-sometimes-crush-hospitals/#content>

27 <sup>24</sup> Tim Greene, *Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10x Price of Stolen Credit Card*  
28 *Numbers*, Computer World (Feb. 6, 2015), <http://www.itworld.com/article/2880960/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html>.

1 continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting  
2 from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.<sup>25</sup>

3 70. Plaintiff and Class Members now face years of constant surveillance of their  
4 financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring and will  
5 continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their Private Information.

6 ***Defendant Fails to Comply with FTC Guidelines***

7 71. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has promulgated numerous guides for  
8 businesses that highlight the importance of implementing reasonable data security practices.  
9 According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored into all business decision-  
10 making.

11  
12 72. In 2016, the FTC updated its publication, *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide*  
13 *for Business*, which established cyber-security guidelines for businesses. These guidelines note  
14 that businesses should protect the personal employee information that they keep; properly dispose  
15 of personal information that is no longer needed; encrypt information stored on computer  
16 networks; understand their network’s vulnerabilities; and implement policies to correct any  
17 security problems.<sup>26</sup>

18  
19 73. The guidelines also recommend that businesses use an intrusion detection system  
20 to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity indicating someone  
21 is attempting to hack the system; watch for large amounts of data being transmitted from the  
22 system; and have a response plan ready in the event of a breach.<sup>27</sup>

23  
24  
25 <sup>25</sup> *Report to Congressional Requesters*, GAO, at 29 (June 2007), available at  
<https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-737.pdf> (“GAO Report”).

26 <sup>26</sup> *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business*, Federal Trade Commission (2016),  
available at [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136\\_proteting-](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf)  
27 [personal-information.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf).

28 <sup>27</sup> *Id.*

1           74.     The FTC further recommends that companies not maintain Private Information  
2 longer than is needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access to sensitive data; require  
3 complex passwords to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor for  
4 suspicious activity on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have implemented  
5 reasonable security measures.  
6

7           75.     The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to  
8 adequately and reasonably protect employee data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and  
9 appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data as an  
10 unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15  
11 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from these actions further clarify the measures businesses must take  
12 to meet their data security obligations.  
13

14           76.     These FTC enforcement actions include actions against healthcare entities, like  
15 Defendant. *See, e.g., In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., a corp*, 2016-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 79708,  
16 2016 WL 4128215, at \*32 (MSNET July 28, 2016) (“[T]he Commission concludes that LabMD’s  
17 data security practices were unreasonable and constitute an unfair act or practice in violation of  
18 Section 5 of the FTC Act.”).

19           77.     Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or  
20 affecting commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice  
21 by businesses, such as Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect Private  
22 Information. The FTC publications and orders described above also form part of the basis of  
23 Defendant’s duty in this regard.  
24

25           78.     Defendant failed to properly implement basic data security practices.  
26  
27  
28

1 79. Defendant’s failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect  
2 against unauthorized access to its residents’ and employees’ Private Information or to comply with  
3 applicable industry standards constitutes an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the  
4 FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

5  
6 80. Upon information and belief, Defendant was at all times fully aware of its  
7 obligation to protect the Private Information of its residents and employees. Defendant was also  
8 aware of the significant repercussions that would result from its failure to do so. Accordingly,  
9 Defendant’s conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of Private  
10 Information it obtained and stored and the foreseeable consequences of the immense damages that  
11 would result to Plaintiff and the Class.

12 ***Defendant Fails to Comply with HIPAA Guidelines***

13  
14 81. Defendant is a covered entity under HIPAA (45 C.F.R. § 160.102) and is required  
15 to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule and Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Part 164,  
16 Subparts A and E (“Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information”), and  
17 Security Rule (“Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health  
18 Information”), 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Part 164, Subparts A and C.

19 82. Defendant is subject to the rules and regulations for safeguarding electronic forms  
20 of medical information pursuant to the Health Information Technology Act (“HITECH”).<sup>28</sup> See 42  
21 U.S.C. §17921, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.

22  
23 83. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule or *Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health*  
24 *Information* establishes national standards for the protection of health information.

25  
26  
27 <sup>28</sup> HIPAA and HITECH work in tandem to provide guidelines and rules for maintaining protected  
28 health information. HITECH references and incorporates HIPAA.

1 84. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule or *Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic*  
2 *Protected Health Information* establishes a national set of security standards for protecting health  
3 information that is kept or transferred in electronic form.

4 85. HIPAA requires “compl[iance] with the applicable standards, implementation  
5 specifications, and requirements” of HIPAA “with respect to electronic protected health  
6 information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.302.

7 86. “Electronic protected health information” is “individually identifiable health  
8 information . . . that is (i) transmitted by electronic media; maintained in electronic media.” 45  
9 C.F.R. § 160.103.

10 87. HIPAA’s Security Rule requires Defendant to do the following:

- 11 a. Ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all  
12 electronic protected health information the covered entity or  
13 business associate creates, receives, maintains, or transmits;  
14 b. Protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to  
15 the security or integrity of such information;  
16 c. Protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of  
17 such information that are not permitted; and  
18 d. Ensure compliance by its workforce.

19 88. HIPAA also requires Defendant to “review and modify the security measures  
20 implemented . . . as needed to continue provision of reasonable and appropriate protection of  
21 electronic protected health information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e). Additionally, Defendant is  
22 required under HIPAA to “[i]mplement technical policies and procedures for electronic  
23 information systems that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access only to  
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1 those persons or software programs that have been granted access rights.” 45 C.F.R. §  
2 164.312(a)(1).

3 89. HIPAA and HITECH also obligated Defendant to implement policies and  
4 procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations, and to protect against uses  
5 or disclosures of electronic protected health information that are reasonably anticipated but not  
6 permitted by the privacy rules. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(1) and § 164.306(a)(3); *see also* 42  
7 U.S.C. §17902.  
8

9 90. The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400-414, also requires  
10 Defendant to provide notice of the Data Breach to each affected individual “without unreasonable  
11 delay and *in no case later than 60 days following discovery of the breach.*”<sup>29</sup>  
12

13 91. HIPAA requires a covered entity to have and apply appropriate sanctions against  
14 members of its workforce who fail to comply with the privacy policies and procedures of the  
15 covered entity or the requirements of 45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subparts D or E. *See* 45 C.F.R. §  
16 164.530(e).

17 92. HIPAA requires a covered entity to mitigate, to the extent practicable, any harmful  
18 effect that is known to the covered entity of a use or disclosure of protected health information in  
19 violation of its policies and procedures or the requirements of 45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subpart E by  
20 the covered entity or its business associate. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(f).  
21

22 93. HIPAA also requires the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”), within the Department of  
23 Health and Human Services (“HHS”), to issue annual guidance documents on the provisions in  
24 the HIPAA Security Rule. *See* 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-164.318. For example, “HHS has developed  
25 guidance and tools to assist HIPAA covered entities in identifying and implementing the most cost  
26

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27 <sup>29</sup> Breach Notification Rule, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, available at  
28 <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-notification/index.html> (emphasis added).

1 effective and appropriate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to protect the  
2 confidentiality, integrity, and availability of e-PHI and comply with the risk analysis requirements  
3 of the Security Rule.” US Department of Health & Human Services, Security Rule Guidance  
4 Material.<sup>30</sup> The list of resources includes a link to guidelines set by the National Institute of  
5 Standards and Technology (NIST), which OCR says “represent the industry standard for good  
6 business practices with respect to standards for securing e-PHI.” US Department of Health &  
7 Human Services, Guidance on Risk Analysis.<sup>31</sup>

9 ***Defendant Fails to Comply with Industry Standards***

10 94. As noted above, experts studying cyber security routinely identify entities in  
11 possession of Private Information as being particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks because of the  
12 value of the Private Information that they collect and maintain.

13 95. Industry professional have identified several best practices that, at a minimum,  
14 should be implemented by healthcare entities in possession of Private Information, like Defendant,  
15 including but not limited to: educating all employees; strong passwords; multi-layer security,  
16 including firewalls, anti-virus, and anti-malware software; encryption, making data unreadable  
17 without a key; multi-factor authentication; backup data and limiting which employees can access  
18 sensitive data. Defendant failed to follow these industry best practices, including a failure to  
19 implement multi-factor authentication.

20 96. Other best cybersecurity practices that are standard in the healthcare industry  
21 include installing appropriate malware detection software; monitoring and limiting the network  
22 ports; protecting web browsers and email management systems; setting up network systems such  
23  
24

25  
26 <sup>30</sup> <http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/index.html>.

27 <sup>31</sup> [https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/guidance-risk-  
28 analysis/index.html](https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/guidance-risk-analysis/index.html)

1 as firewalls, switches and routers; monitoring and protection of physical security systems;  
2 protection against any possible communication system; training staff regarding critical points.

3 Defendant failed to follow these cybersecurity best practices, including failure to train staff.

4  
5 97. Defendant failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the following  
6 frameworks: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 (including without limitation  
7 PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.AT-1, PR.DS-1, PR.DS-5,  
8 PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-4, DE.CM-7, DE.CM-8, and RS.CO-2), and the Center for  
9 Internet Security’s Critical Security Controls (CIS CSC), which are all established standards in  
10 reasonable cybersecurity readiness.

11 98. These foregoing frameworks are existing and applicable industry standards in the  
12 healthcare industry, and upon information and belief, Defendant failed to comply with at least one—  
13 —or all—of these accepted standards, thereby opening the door to the threat actor and causing the  
14 Data Breach.

15  
16 **COMMON INJURIES & DAMAGES**

17 99. As a result of Defendant’s ineffective and inadequate data security practices, the  
18 Data Breach, and the foreseeable consequences of Private Information ending up in the possession  
19 of criminals, the risk of identity theft to the Plaintiff and Class Members has materialized and is  
20 imminent, and Plaintiff and Class Members have all sustained actual injuries and damages,  
21 including: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of their Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished  
22 value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to  
23 mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost  
24 opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data  
25 Breach; (vii) statutory damages; (viii) nominal damages; and (ix) the continued and certainly  
26  
27  
28

1 increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for  
2 unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant's  
3 possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to  
4 undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.

5  
6 ***The Data Breach Increases Victims' Risk of Identity Theft***

7 100. The unencrypted Private Information of Class Members will end up for sale on the  
8 dark web, as that is the *modus operandi* of hackers.

9 101. Unencrypted Private Information may also fall into the hands of companies that  
10 will use the detailed Private Information for targeted marketing without the approval of Plaintiff  
11 and Class Members. Simply, unauthorized individuals can easily access the Private Information of  
12 Plaintiff and Class Members.

13 102. The link between a data breach and the risk of identity theft is simple and well  
14 established. Criminals acquire and steal Private Information to monetize the information.  
15 Criminals monetize the data by selling the stolen information on the black market to other  
16 criminals who then utilize the information to commit a variety of identity theft related crimes  
17 discussed below.

18 103. Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information is of great value to hackers and  
19 cyber criminals, and the data stolen in the Data Breach has been used and will continue to be used  
20 in a variety of sordid ways for criminals to exploit Plaintiff and Class Members and to profit off  
21 their misfortune.

22 104. Because a person's identity is akin to a puzzle, the more accurate pieces of data an  
23 identity thief obtains about a person, the easier it is for the thief to take on the victim's identity, or  
24 otherwise harass or track the victim. For example, armed with just a name and date of birth, a data  
25  
26  
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28

1 thief can utilize a hacking technique referred to as “social engineering” to obtain even more  
2 information about a victim’s identity, such as a person’s login credentials or Social Security  
3 number. Social engineering is a form of hacking whereby a data thief uses previously acquired  
4 information to manipulate individuals into disclosing additional confidential or personal  
5 information through means such as spam phone calls and text messages or phishing emails.  
6

7 105. In fact, as technology advances, computer programs may scan the Internet with a  
8 wider scope to create a mosaic of information that may be used to link compromised information  
9 to an individual in ways that were not previously possible. This is known as the “mosaic effect.”

10 106. One such example of criminals piecing together bits and pieces of compromised  
11 Private Information for profit is the development of “Fullz” packages.<sup>32</sup>

12 107. With “Fullz” packages, cyber-criminals can cross-reference two sources of Private  
13 Information to marry unregulated data available elsewhere to criminally stolen data with an  
14 astonishingly complete scope and degree of accuracy in order to assemble complete dossiers on  
15 individuals.  
16

17  
18  
19 

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<sup>32</sup> “Fullz” is fraudster speak for data that includes the information of the victim, including, but not  
20 limited to, the name, address, credit card information, social security number, date of birth, and  
21 more. As a rule of thumb, the more information you have on a victim, the more money that can be  
22 made off of those credentials. Fullz are usually pricier than standard credit card credentials,  
23 commanding up to \$100 per record (or more) on the dark web. Fullz can be cashed out (turning  
24 credentials into money) in various ways, including performing bank transactions over the phone  
25 with the required authentication details in-hand. Even “dead Fullz,” which are Fullz credentials  
26 associated with credit cards that are no longer valid, can still be used for numerous purposes,  
27 including tax refund scams, ordering credit cards on behalf of the victim, or opening a “mule  
28 account” (an account that will accept a fraudulent money transfer from a compromised account)  
without the victim’s knowledge. *See, e.g.,* Brian Krebs, *Medical Records for Sale in Underground  
Stolen From Texas Life Insurance Firm*, Krebs on Security (Sep. 18, 2014),  
<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-underground-stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-firm/>.

1           108. The development of “Fullz” packages means here that the stolen Private  
2 Information from the Data Breach can easily be used to link and identify it to Plaintiff’s and Class  
3 Members’ phone numbers, email addresses, and other unregulated sources and identifiers. In other  
4 words, even if certain information such as emails, phone numbers, or credit card numbers may not  
5 be included in the Private Information that was exfiltrated in the Data Breach, criminals may still  
6 easily create a Fullz package and sell it at a higher price to unscrupulous operators and criminals  
7 (such as illegal and scam telemarketers) over and over.

9           109. The existence and prevalence of “Fullz” packages means that the Private  
10 Information stolen in the Data Breach can easily be linked to the unregulated data (like phone  
11 numbers and emails) of Plaintiff and the other Class Members.

12           110. Thus, even if certain information (such as Social Security numbers) was not stolen  
13 in the data breach, criminals can still easily create a comprehensive “Fullz” package. Then, this  
14 comprehensive dossier can be sold—and then resold in perpetuity—to crooked operators and other  
15 criminals (like illegal and scam telemarketers).

17           ***Loss of Time to Mitigate the Risk of Identity Theft and Fraud***

18           111. As a result of the recognized risk of identity theft, when a Data Breach occurs and  
19 an individual is notified by a company that their Private Information was compromised (as in this  
20 Data Breach), the reasonable person is expected to take steps and spend time to address the  
21 dangerous situation, learn about the breach, and otherwise mitigate the risk of becoming a victim  
22 of identity theft or fraud. Failure to spend time taking steps to review accounts or credit reports  
23 could expose the individual to greater financial harm—yet, the resource and asset of time has been  
24 lost.  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 112. Thus, due to the actual and imminent risk of identity theft, Defendant instructs  
2 Plaintiff and Class Members to do the following: “[w]e encourage you to remain vigilant against  
3 incidents of identity theft and fraud by reviewing your account statements and monitoring your  
4 free credit reports for suspicious activity.”<sup>33</sup>

5  
6 113. Plaintiff and Class Members have spent, and will spend additional time in the  
7 future, on a variety of prudent actions, such as researching and verifying the legitimacy of the Data  
8 Breach upon receiving the Notice Letter, as well as monitoring their financial accounts for any  
9 indication of fraudulent activity, which may take years to detect.

10 114. Plaintiff’s mitigation efforts are consistent with the U.S. Government  
11 Accountability Office that released a report in 2007 regarding data breaches (“GAO Report”) in  
12 which it noted that victims of identity theft will face “substantial costs and time to repair the  
13 damage to their good name and credit record.”<sup>34</sup>

14  
15 115. Plaintiff’s mitigation efforts are also consistent with the steps that FTC  
16 recommends that data breach victims take several steps to protect their personal and financial  
17 information after a data breach, including: contacting one of the credit bureaus to place a fraud  
18 alert (consider an extended fraud alert that lasts for seven years if someone steals their identity),  
19 reviewing their credit reports, contacting companies to remove fraudulent charges from their  
20 accounts, placing a credit freeze on their credit, and correcting their credit reports.<sup>35</sup>

21  
22 116. And for those Class Members who experience actual identity theft and fraud, the  
23 United States Government Accountability Office released a report in 2007 regarding data breaches  
24  
25

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26 <sup>33</sup> Notice Letter.

27 <sup>34</sup> See GAO Report, *supra* n.25.

28 <sup>35</sup> See Federal Trade Commission, *Identity Theft.gov*, <https://www.identitytheft.gov/Steps> (last visited July 7, 2022).

1 in which it noted that victims of identity theft will face “substantial costs and time to repair the  
2 damage to their good name and credit record.”<sup>36</sup>

### 3 DIMINUTION OF VALUE OF PII AND PHI

4 117. PII and PHI are valuable property rights.<sup>36</sup> Their value is axiomatic, considering the  
5 value of Big Data in corporate America and that the consequences of cyber thefts include heavy  
6 prison sentences. Even this obvious risk to reward analysis illustrates beyond doubt that Private  
7 Information has considerable market value.  
8

9 118. Sensitive PII can sell for as much as \$363 per record according to the Infosec  
10 Institute.<sup>37</sup>

11 119. An active and robust legitimate marketplace for PII also exists. In 2019, the data  
12 brokering industry was worth roughly \$200 billion.<sup>38</sup>

13 120. In fact, the data marketplace is so sophisticated that consumers can actually sell  
14 their non-public information directly to a data broker, who in turn aggregates the information and  
15 provides it to marketers or app developers.<sup>39,40</sup>

16 121. Consumers who agree to provide their web browsing history to the Nielsen  
17 Corporation can receive up to \$50.00 a year.<sup>41</sup>  
18  
19  
20  
21

22 <sup>36</sup> See GAO Report, *supra* n.25.

23 <sup>37</sup> See, e.g., Randall T. Soma, et al, *Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally*  
24 *Identifiable Information (“Private Information”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets*, 15 Rich.  
25 J.L. & Tech. 11, at \*3–4 (2009) (“Private Information, which companies obtain at little cost, has  
26 quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional financial  
27 assets.”) (citations omitted).

28 <sup>38</sup> See Ashiq Ja, *Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market*, InfoSec (July 27, 2015),  
<https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/>.

<sup>39</sup> <https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-11-05/column-data-brokers>

<sup>40</sup> <https://datacoup.com/>

<sup>41</sup> <https://digi.me/what-is-digime/>

1           122. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information,  
2 which has an inherent market value in both legitimate and dark markets, has been damaged and  
3 diminished by its compromise and unauthorized release. However, this transfer of value occurred  
4 without any consideration paid to Plaintiff or Class Members for their property, resulting in an  
5 economic loss. Moreover, the Private Information is now readily available, and the rarity of the  
6 Data has been lost, thereby causing additional loss of value.  
7

8           123. At all relevant times, Prestige knew, or reasonably should have known, of the  
9 importance of safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, and of the  
10 foreseeable consequences that would occur if Defendant’s data security system was breached,  
11 including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members  
12 as a result of a breach.  
13

14           124. The fraudulent activity resulting from the Data Breach may not come to light for  
15 years.  
16

17           125. Plaintiff and Class Members now face years of constant surveillance of their  
18 financial and personal records. The Class is incurring and will continue to incur such damages in  
19 addition to any fraudulent use of their Private Information .  
20

21           126. Prestige was, or should have been, fully aware of the unique type and the significant  
22 volume of data on Defendant’s network, amounting to over thirty thousand individuals’ Private  
23 Information and, thus, the significant number of individuals who would be harmed by the exposure  
24 of the unencrypted data.  
25

26           127. The injuries to Plaintiff and Class Members were directly and proximately caused  
27 by Defendant’s failure to implement or maintain adequate data security measures for the Private  
28 Information of Plaintiff and Class Members.  
29

1           ***Future Cost of Credit and Identity Theft Monitoring is Reasonable and Necessary***

2           128. Given the type of targeted attack in this case, sophisticated criminal activity, the  
3 type of Private Information involved, and the volume of Private Information impacted in the Data  
4 Breach, there is a strong probability that entire batches of stolen information have been placed, or  
5 will be placed, on the black market/dark web for sale and purchase by criminals intending to utilize  
6 the Private Information for identity theft crimes—*e.g.*, opening bank accounts in the victims’  
7 names to make purchases or to launder money; file false tax returns; take out loans or lines of  
8 credit; or file false unemployment claims.

9  
10           129. Such fraud may go undetected until debt collection calls commence months, or even  
11 years, later. An individual may not know that his or her Private Information was used to file for  
12 unemployment benefits until law enforcement notifies the individual’s employer of the suspected  
13 fraud. Fraudulent tax returns are typically discovered only when an individual’s authentic tax  
14 return is rejected.

15  
16           130. Consequently, Plaintiff and Class Members are at an increased risk of fraud and  
17 identity theft for many years into the future.

18           131. The retail cost of credit monitoring and identity theft monitoring can cost around  
19 \$200 a year per Class Member. This is reasonable and necessary cost to monitor to protect Class  
20 Members from the risk of identity theft that arose from Defendant’s Data Breach.

21  
22           ***Loss of Benefit of the Bargain***

23           132. Furthermore, Defendant’s poor data security deprived Plaintiff and Class Members  
24 of the benefit of their bargain. When agreeing to become a resident and/or employee at Defendant  
25 under certain terms, Plaintiff and other reasonable consumers understood and expected that they  
26 were either (a) being paid less as an employee, or (2) paying more as a resident in order to for  
27  
28

1 Defendant to provide the necessary data security to protect their Private Information. In fact,  
2 Prestige did not provide the expected data security. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class Members  
3 received employment positions or residential care that were of a lesser value than what they  
4 reasonably expected to receive under the bargains they struck with Defendant.  
5

6 **PLAINTIFF BRIM’S EXPERIENCE**

7 133. Plaintiff Brim is a former Prestige employee who worked there from approximately  
8 2012 through 2016.

9 134. In order to obtain employment from Defendant, she was required to provide her  
10 Private Information to Defendant, including her name, Social Security number, health insurance  
11 information, and medical information.

12 135. At the time the Data Breach was discovered—on or around September 7, 2023—  
13 Prestige retained Plaintiff Brim’s Private Information in its system.  
14

15 136. Plaintiff Brim is very careful about sharing her sensitive Private Information.  
16 Plaintiff stores any documents containing her Private Information in a safe and secure location.  
17 She has never knowingly transmitted unencrypted sensitive Private Information over the internet  
18 or any other unsecured source.

19 137. Plaintiff Brim received the Notice Letter, by mail, directly from Defendant, dated  
20 January 31, 2024. According to the Notice Letter, Plaintiff’s Private Information was improperly  
21 accessed and obtained by unauthorized third parties, including her name, Social Security number,  
22 health insurance information, and medical information.  
23

24 138. As a result of the Data Breach, and at the direction of Defendant’s Notice Letter—  
25 which instructs Plaintiff to “remain vigilant against incidents of identity theft and fraud by  
26 reviewing your account statements and monitoring your free credit reports for suspicious  
27  
28

1 activity”<sup>42</sup>—Plaintiff Brim made reasonable efforts to mitigate the impact of the Data Breach,  
2 including but not limited to researching and verifying the Data Breach upon receiving the Notice  
3 Letter, as well as monitoring her financial accounts for any indication of fraudulent activity, which  
4 may take years to detect. Plaintiff has spent significant time dealing with the Data Breach—  
5 valuable time Plaintiff otherwise would have spent on other activities, including but not limited to  
6 work and/or recreation. This time has been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.  
7

8 139. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having her Private Information compromised  
9 as a result of the Data Breach including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of her  
10 Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and  
11 opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data  
12 Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to  
13 mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii) statutory damages; (viii) nominal  
14 damages; and (ix) the continued and certainly increased risk to her Private Information, which: (a)  
15 remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b)  
16 remains backed up in Defendant’s possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so  
17 long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private  
18 Information.  
19

20 140. The Data Breach has caused Plaintiff Brim to suffer fear, anxiety, and stress, which  
21 has been compounded by the fact that Prestige has still not fully informed her of key details about  
22 the Data Breach’s occurrence.  
23

24 141. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff Brim anticipates spending considerable  
25 time and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data  
26

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27 <sup>42</sup> Notice Letter.  
28

1 Breach. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff Brim is at a present risk and will continue to be at  
2 increased risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.

3  
4 **CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

5 142. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly  
6 situated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

7 143. The Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows:

8 **Nationwide Class**

9 All individuals residing in the United States whose Private Information was accessed  
10 and/or acquired by an unauthorized party as a result of the data breach reported by  
11 Defendant in January 2024 (the “Class”).

12 144. Excluded from the Class are the following individuals and/or entities: Defendant  
13 and Defendant's parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, and any entity in which  
14 Defendant have a controlling interest; all individuals who make a timely election to be excluded  
15 from this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting out; and all judges assigned to hear any  
16 aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members.

17 145. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definitions of the Class or add a Class or  
18 Subclass if further information and discovery indicate that the definitions of the Class should be  
19 narrowed, expanded, or otherwise modified.

20 146. Numerosity: The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members  
21 is impracticable, if not completely impossible. According to the breach report submitted to the  
22 Office of the Maine Attorney General, 38,087 persons were impacted in the Data Breach.<sup>43</sup> The  
23 Class is apparently identifiable within Defendant’s records, and Defendant has already identified  
24 these individuals (as evidenced by sending them breach notification letters).

25  
26  
27 <sup>43</sup> <https://apps.web.maine.gov/online/aewiewer/ME/40/d71b6f68-8cda-420e-a064-64a3ae3dc47c.shtml>The

1 147. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and  
2 predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. Among the  
3 questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over questions which may affect  
4 individual Class members, including the following:

- 5 a. Whether and to what extent Defendant had a duty to protect the Private Information  
6 of Plaintiff and Class Members;
- 7 b. Whether Defendant had respective duties not to disclose the Private Information of  
8 Plaintiff and Class Members to unauthorized third parties;
- 9 c. Whether Defendant had respective duties not to use the Private Information of  
10 Plaintiff and Class Members for non-business purposes;
- 11 d. Whether Defendant failed to adequately safeguard the Private Information of  
12 Plaintiff and Class Members;
- 13 e. Whether and when Defendant actually learned of the Data Breach;
- 14 f. Whether Defendant adequately, promptly, and accurately informed Plaintiff and  
15 Class Members that their Private Information had been compromised;
- 16 g. Whether Defendant violated the law by failing to promptly notify Plaintiff and  
17 Class Members that their Private Information had been compromised;
- 18 h. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security  
19 procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information  
20 compromised in the Data Breach;
- 21 i. Whether Defendant adequately addressed and fixed the vulnerabilities that  
22 permitted the Data Breach to occur;
- 23 j. Whether Defendant's conduct was unfair or deceptive, or both;
- 24
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1 k. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to actual damages, statutory  
2 damages, and/or nominal damages as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct;

3 l. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief to redress the  
4 imminent and currently ongoing harm faced as a result of the Data Breach.

5 148. Typicality: Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of the other members of the Class  
6 because Plaintiff, like every other Class Member, was exposed to virtually identical conduct and  
7 now suffers from the same violations of the law as each other member of the Class.

8 149. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is also appropriate for  
9 certification because Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the  
10 Class, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards  
11 of conduct toward the Class Members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect  
12 to the Class as a whole. Defendant's policies challenged herein apply to and affect Class Members  
13 uniformly and Plaintiff's challenge of these policies hinges on Defendant's conduct with respect  
14 to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff.

15 150. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of  
16 the Class Members in that she has no disabling conflicts of interest that would be antagonistic to  
17 those of the other Class Members. Plaintiff seeks no relief that is antagonistic or adverse to the  
18 Class Members, and the infringement of the rights and the damages she has suffered are typical of  
19 other Class Members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in complex class action and data  
20 breach litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously.

21 151. Superiority: Class litigation is an appropriate method for fair and efficient  
22 adjudication of the claims involved. Class action treatment is superior to all other available  
23 methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein; it will permit a  
24

1 large number of Class Members to prosecute their common claims in a single forum  
2 simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, and  
3 expense that hundreds of individual actions would require. Class action treatment will permit the  
4 adjudication of relatively modest claims by certain Class Members, who could not individually  
5 afford to litigate a complex claim against large corporations, like Defendant. Further, even for  
6 those Class Members who could afford to litigate such a claim, it would still be economically  
7 impractical and impose a burden on the courts.  
8

9       152. The nature of this action and the nature of laws available to Plaintiff and Class  
10 Members make the use of the class action device a particularly efficient and appropriate procedure  
11 to afford relief to Plaintiff and Class Members for the wrongs alleged because Defendant would  
12 necessarily gain an unconscionable advantage since they would be able to exploit and overwhelm  
13 the limited resources of each individual Class Member with superior financial and legal resources;  
14 the costs of individual suits could unreasonably consume the amounts that would be recovered;  
15 proof of a common course of conduct to which Plaintiff was exposed is representative of that  
16 experienced by the Class and will establish the right of each Class Member to recover on the cause  
17 of action alleged; and individual actions would create a risk of inconsistent results and would be  
18 unnecessary and duplicative of this litigation.  
19

20       153. The litigation of the claims brought herein is manageable. Defendant's uniform  
21 conduct, the consistent provisions of the relevant laws, and the ascertainable identities of Class  
22 Members demonstrates that there would be no significant manageability problems with  
23 prosecuting this lawsuit as a class action.  
24

25       154. Adequate notice can be given to Class Members directly using information  
26 maintained in Defendant's records.  
27  
28

1           155. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendant may continue in its failure to  
2 properly secure the Private Information of Class Members, Defendant may continue to refuse to  
3 provide proper notification to Class Members regarding the Data Breach, and Defendant may  
4 continue to act unlawfully as set forth in this Complaint.

5  
6           156. Further, Defendant has acted on grounds that apply generally to the Class as a  
7 whole, so that class certification, injunctive relief, and corresponding declaratory relief are  
8 appropriate on a class- wide basis.

9           157. Likewise, particular issues under Rule 23(b)(3) are appropriate for certification  
10 because such claims present only particular, common issues, the resolution of which would  
11 advance the disposition of this matter and the parties' interests therein. Such particular issues  
12 include, but are not limited to:

- 13           a. Whether Defendant failed to timely notify the Plaintiff and the class of the Data  
14 Breach;
- 15           b. Whether Defendant owed a legal duty to Plaintiff and the Class to exercise due care  
16 in collecting, storing, and safeguarding their Private Information;
- 17           c. Whether Defendant's security measures to protect their data systems were  
18 reasonable in light of best practices recommended by data security experts;
- 19           d. Whether Defendant's failure to institute adequate protective security measures  
20 amounted to negligence;
- 21           e. Whether Defendant's conduct was unfair or deceptive, or both;
- 22           f. Whether Defendant failed to take commercially reasonable steps to safeguard  
23 consumer Private Information; and Whether adherence to FTC data security  
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1 recommendations, and measures recommended by data security experts would have  
2 reasonably prevented the Data Breach.

3 **COUNT I**  
4 **Negligence**  
5 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

6 158. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs, as if  
7 fully set forth herein.

8 159. Defendant requires its residents and employees, including Plaintiff and Class  
9 Members, to submit non-public Private Information in the ordinary course of providing its  
10 services.

11 160. Defendant gathered and stored the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class  
12 Members as part of its business of soliciting its residents and employees, which solicitations and  
13 services affect commerce.

14 161. Plaintiff and Class Members entrusted Defendant with their Private Information  
15 with the understanding that Defendant would safeguard their information.

16 162. Defendant had full knowledge of the sensitivity of the Private Information and the  
17 types of harm that Plaintiff and Class Members could and would suffer if the Private Information  
18 were wrongfully disclosed.

19 163. By assuming the responsibility to collect and store this data, and in fact doing so,  
20 and sharing it and using it for commercial gain, Defendant had a duty of care to use reasonable  
21 means to secure and safeguard their computer property—and Class Members' Private Information  
22 held within it—to prevent disclosure of the information, and to safeguard the information from  
23 theft. Defendant's duty included a responsibility to implement processes by which it could detect  
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1 a breach of its security systems in a reasonably expeditious time and to give prompt notice to those  
2 affected in the case of a data breach.

3 164. Defendant had a duty to employ reasonable security measures under Section 5 of  
4 the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or  
5 affecting commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair practice of  
6 failing to use reasonable measures to protect confidential data.  
7

8 165. Defendant’s duty to use reasonable security measures under HIPAA required  
9 Defendant to “reasonably protect” confidential data from “any intentional or unintentional use or  
10 disclosure” and to “have in place appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to  
11 protect the privacy of protected health information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(1). Some or all of the  
12 healthcare and/or medical information at issue in this case constitutes “protected health  
13 information” within the meaning of HIPAA.  
14

15 166. For instance, HIPAA required Defendant to notify victims of the Breach within 60  
16 days of the discovery of the Data Breach. Defendant did not begin to notify Plaintiff or Class  
17 Members of the Data Breach until January 31, 2024, despite, upon information and belief,  
18 Defendant knowing shortly after September 7, 2023 that unauthorized persons had accessed and  
19 acquired the private, protected, personal information of Plaintiff and the Class.  
20

21 167. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class Members to provide data  
22 security consistent with industry standards and other requirements discussed herein, and to ensure  
23 that its systems and networks, and the personnel responsible for them, adequately protected the  
24 Private Information.

25 168. Defendant’s duty of care to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of  
26 the special relationship that existed between Defendant and its residents and employees. That  
27  
28

1 special relationship arose because Plaintiff and the Class entrusted Defendant with their  
2 confidential Private Information, a necessary part of being residents and employees of Defendant.

3 169. Defendant’s duty to use reasonable care in protecting confidential data arose not  
4 only as a result of the statutes and regulations described above, but also because Defendant is  
5 bound by industry standards to protect confidential Private Information.  
6

7 170. Defendant was subject to an “independent duty,” untethered to any contract  
8 between Defendant and Plaintiff or the Class.

9 171. Defendant also had a duty to exercise appropriate clearinghouse practices to remove  
10 former residents’ and employees’ Private Information it was no longer required to retain pursuant  
11 to regulations.

12 172. Moreover, Defendant had a duty to promptly and adequately notify Plaintiff and  
13 the Class of the Data Breach.  
14

15 173. Defendant had and continues to have a duty to adequately disclose that the Private  
16 Information of Plaintiff and the Class within Defendant’s possession might have been  
17 compromised, how it was compromised, and precisely the types of data that were compromised  
18 and when. Such notice was necessary to allow Plaintiff and the Class to take steps to prevent,  
19 mitigate, and repair any identity theft and the fraudulent use of their Private Information by third  
20 parties.  
21

22 174. Defendant breached its duties, pursuant to the FTC Act, HIPAA, and other  
23 applicable standards, and thus were negligent, by failing to use reasonable measures to protect  
24 Class Members’ Private Information. The specific negligent acts and omissions committed by  
25 Defendant include, but are not limited to, the following:  
26  
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28

- 1 a. Failing to adopt, implement, and maintain adequate security measures to
- 2 safeguard Class Members' Private Information;
- 3 b. Failing to adequately monitor the security of its networks and systems;
- 4 c. Allowing unauthorized access to Class Members' Private Information;
- 5 d. Failing to detect in a timely manner that Class Members' Private Information had
- 6 been compromised;
- 7 e. Failing to remove former residents' and employees' Private Information it was no
- 8 longer required to retain pursuant to regulations,
- 9 f. Failing to timely and adequately notify Class Members about the Data Breach's
- 10 occurrence and scope, so that they could take appropriate steps to mitigate the
- 11 potential for identity theft and other damages; and
- 12 g. Failing to secure its stand-alone personal computers, such as the reception desk
- 13 computers, even after discovery of the data breach.
- 14
- 15

16 175. Defendant violated Section 5 of the FTC Act and HIPAA by failing to use  
17 reasonable measures to protect Private Information and not complying with applicable industry  
18 standards, as described in detail herein. Defendant's conduct was particularly unreasonable given  
19 the nature and amount of Private Information it obtained and stored and the foreseeable  
20 consequences of the immense damages that would result to Plaintiff and the Class.

21 176. Plaintiff and the Class are within the class of persons that the FTC Act and HIPAA  
22 were intended to protect.

23 177. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm the FTC  
24 Act and HIPAA were intended to guard against.

1 178. Defendant's violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act and HIPAA constitutes  
2 negligence.

3 179. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against businesses, which, as a result of  
4 their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive practices,  
5 caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiff and the Class.  
6

7 180. A breach of security, unauthorized access, and resulting injury to Plaintiff and the  
8 Class was reasonably foreseeable, particularly in light of Defendant's inadequate security  
9 practices.

10 181. It was foreseeable that Defendant's failure to use reasonable measures to protect  
11 Class Members' Private Information would result in injury to Class Members. Further, the Data  
12 Breach was reasonably foreseeable given the known high frequency of cyberattacks and data  
13 breaches in the healthcare industry.  
14

15 182. Defendant has full knowledge of the sensitivity of the Private Information and the  
16 types of harm that Plaintiff and the Class could and would suffer if the Private Information were  
17 wrongfully disclosed.

18 183. Plaintiff and the Class were the foreseeable and probable victims of any inadequate  
19 security practices and procedures. Defendant knew or should have known of the inherent risks in  
20 collecting and storing the Private Information of Plaintiff and the Class, the critical importance of  
21 providing adequate security of that Private Information, and the necessity for encrypting Private  
22 Information stored on Defendant's systems.  
23

24 184. It was therefore foreseeable that the failure to adequately safeguard Class Members'  
25 Private Information would result in one or more types of injuries to Class Members.  
26  
27  
28

1 185. Plaintiff and the Class had no ability to protect their Private Information that was  
2 in, and possibly remains in, Defendant's possession.

3 186. Defendant was in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiff and  
4 the Class as a result of the Data Breach.

5 187. Defendant's duty extended to protecting Plaintiff and the Class from the risk of  
6 foreseeable criminal conduct of third parties, which has been recognized in situations where the  
7 actor's own conduct or misconduct exposes another to the risk or defeats protections put in place  
8 to guard against the risk, or where the parties are in a special relationship. *See* Restatement  
9 (Second) of Torts § 302B. Numerous courts and legislatures have also recognized the existence of  
10 a specific duty to reasonably safeguard personal information.  
11

12 188. Defendant has admitted that the Private Information of Plaintiff and the Class was  
13 wrongfully lost and disclosed to unauthorized third persons as a result of the Data Breach.  
14

15 189. But for Defendant's wrongful and negligent breach of duties owed to Plaintiff and  
16 the Class, the Private Information of Plaintiff and the Class would not have been compromised.

17 190. There is a close causal connection between Defendant's failure to implement  
18 security measures to protect the Private Information of Plaintiff and the Class and the harm, or risk  
19 of imminent harm, suffered by Plaintiff and the Class. The Private Information of Plaintiff and the  
20 Class was lost and accessed as the proximate result of Defendant's failure to exercise reasonable  
21 care in safeguarding such Private Information by adopting, implementing, and maintaining  
22 appropriate security measures.  
23

24 191. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff and the Class  
25 have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft  
26 of their Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and  
27  
28

1 opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data  
2 Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to  
3 mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii) statutory damages; (viii) nominal  
4 damages; and (ix) the continued and certainly increased risk to their Private Information, which:  
5 (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b)  
6 remains backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so  
7 long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private  
8 Information.  
9

10 192. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff and the Class  
11 have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm, including, but not  
12 limited to, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of privacy, and other economic and non-economic  
13 losses.  
14

15 193. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to compensatory and consequential  
16 damages suffered as a result of the Data Breach.

17 194. Defendant's negligent conduct is ongoing, in that it still holds the Private  
18 Information of Plaintiff and Class Members in an unsafe and insecure manner.

19 195. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to injunctive relief requiring  
20 Defendant to (i) strengthen its data security systems and monitoring procedures; (ii) submit to  
21 future annual audits of those systems and monitoring procedures; and (iii) continue to provide  
22 adequate credit monitoring to all Class Members.  
23

24 //

25 //

26 //

**COUNT II**  
**Breach of Implied Contract**  
**(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

1  
2  
3       196. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs, as if  
4 fully set forth herein.

5  
6       197. Plaintiff and Class Members were required to provide their Private Information to  
7 Defendant as a condition of obtaining employment with or residency at Defendant.

8       198. Plaintiff and the Class entrusted their Private Information to Defendant. In so doing,  
9 Plaintiff and the Class entered into implied contracts with Defendant by which Defendant agreed  
10 to safeguard and protect such information, to keep such information secure and confidential, and  
11 to timely and accurately notify Plaintiff and the Class if their data had been breached and  
12 compromised or stolen.

13  
14       199. Implicit in the agreement between Plaintiff and Class Members and the Defendant  
15 to provide Private Information, was the latter's obligation to: (a) use such Private Information for  
16 business purposes only, (b) take reasonable steps to safeguard that Private Information, (c) prevent  
17 unauthorized disclosures of the Private Information, (d) provide Plaintiff and Class Members with  
18 prompt and sufficient notice of any and all unauthorized access and/or theft of their Private  
19 Information, (e) reasonably safeguard and protect the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class  
20 Members from unauthorized disclosure or uses, (f) retain the Private Information only under  
21 conditions that kept such information secure and confidential.

22  
23       200. The mutual understanding and intent of Plaintiff and Class Members on the one  
24 hand, and Defendant, on the other, is demonstrated by their conduct and course of dealing.

1           201. Defendant solicited, offered, and invited Plaintiff and Class Members to provide  
2 their Private Information as part of Defendant’s regular business practices. Plaintiff and Class  
3 Members accepted Defendant’s offers and provided their Private Information to Defendant.

4           202. In accepting the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, Defendant  
5 understood and agreed that it was required to reasonably safeguard the Private Information from  
6 unauthorized access or disclosure.

7           203. On information and belief, at all relevant times Defendant promulgated, adopted,  
8 and implemented written privacy policies whereby it expressly promised Plaintiff and Class  
9 Members that it would disclose Private Information only under certain circumstances, none of  
10 which relate to the Data Breach.

11           204. On information and belief, Defendant further promised to comply with industry  
12 standards and to make sure that Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information would remain  
13 protected.

14           205. In entering into such implied contracts, Plaintiff and Class Members reasonably  
15 believed and expected that Defendant’s data security practices complied with relevant laws and  
16 regulations and were consistent with industry standards.

17           206. Plaintiff and Class Members paid money to Defendant, or received less money from  
18 Defendant, with the reasonable belief and expectation that Defendant would use part of its earnings  
19 to obtain adequate data security. Defendant failed to do so.

20           207. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information to  
21 Defendant in the absence of the implied contract between them and Defendant to keep their  
22 information reasonably secure.

1 208. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information to  
2 Defendant in the absence of their implied promise to monitor their computer systems and networks  
3 to ensure that it adopted reasonable data security measures.

4 209. Plaintiff and Class Members fully and adequately performed their obligations under  
5 the implied contracts with Defendant.  
6

7 210. Defendant breached the implied contracts it made with Plaintiff and the Class by  
8 failing to safeguard and protect their personal information, by failing to delete the information of  
9 Plaintiff and the Class once the relationship ended, and by failing to provide accurate notice to  
10 them that personal information was compromised as a result of the Data Breach.

11 211. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of the implied contracts,  
12 Plaintiff and Class Members sustained damages, as alleged herein, including the loss of the benefit  
13 of the bargain.  
14

15 212. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to compensatory, consequential, and  
16 nominal damages suffered as a result of the Data Breach.

17 213. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to injunctive relief requiring  
18 Defendant to, *e.g.*, (i) strengthen its data security systems and monitoring procedures; (ii) submit  
19 to future annual audits of those systems and monitoring procedures; and (iii) immediately provide  
20 adequate credit monitoring to all Class Members.  
21

22 **COUNT III**  
23 **Unjust Enrichment**  
**(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

24 214. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs, as if  
25 fully set forth herein.  
26  
27  
28

1 215. Plaintiff brings this claim in the alternative to the breach of implied contract claim  
2 above.

3 216. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a monetary benefit on Defendant by  
4 providing Defendant with their labor and/or their Private Information to Defendant.

5 217. Defendant appreciated that a monetary benefit was being conferred upon it by  
6 Plaintiff and Class Members and accepted that monetary benefit.

7 218. However, acceptance of the benefit under the facts and circumstances outlined  
8 above make it inequitable for Defendant to retain that benefit without payment of the value thereof.

9 219. Specifically, Defendant enriched itself by saving the costs it reasonably should have  
10 expended on data security measures to secure Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.  
11 Instead of providing a reasonable level of security that would have prevented the Data Breach,  
12 Defendant instead calculated to increase its own profits at the expense of Plaintiff and Class  
13 Members by utilizing cheaper, ineffective security measures. Plaintiff and Class Members, on the  
14 other hand, suffered as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's decision to prioritize its own  
15 profits over the requisite data security.

16 220. Under the principles of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be  
17 permitted to retain the monetary benefit belonging to Plaintiff and Class Members, because  
18 Defendant failed to implement appropriate data management and security measures.

19 221. Defendant acquired Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information through  
20 inequitable means in that it failed to disclose the inadequate security practices previously alleged.

21 222. If Plaintiff and Class Members knew that Defendant had not secured their Private  
22 Information, they would not have agreed to provide their Private Information to Defendant or  
23 obtained employment at Defendant.

1 223. Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law.

2 224. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff and Class  
3 Members have suffered or will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy;  
4 (ii) theft of their Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost  
5 time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the  
6 Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with  
7 attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii) statutory damages; (viii)  
8 nominal damages; and (ix) the continued and certainly increased risk to their Private Information,  
9 which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse;  
10 and (b) remains backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized  
11 disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect  
12 the Private Information.  
13  
14

15 225. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff and Class  
16 Members have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm.

17 226. Defendant should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund or constructive  
18 trust, for the benefit of Plaintiff and Class Members, proceeds that they unjustly received from  
19 them.  
20

21 **COUNT IV**  
22 **Violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86**  
23 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

24 227. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs, as if  
25 fully set forth herein.  
26  
27  
28

1           228. The Washington State Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020 (the “CPA”)  
2 prohibits any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in the conduct of any trade or commerce as  
3 those terms are described by the CPA and relevant case law.

4           229. Defendant is a “person” as described in RCW 19.86.010(1).

5           230. Defendant engages in “trade” and “commerce” as described in RCW 19.86.010(2)  
6 in that it engages in the sale of services and commerce directly and indirectly affecting the  
7 people of the State of Washington.

8           231. By virtue of the above-described wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and want  
9 of ordinary care that directly and proximately caused the Data Breach, Defendant engaged in  
10 unlawful, unfair and fraudulent practices within the meaning, and in violation of, the CPA, in  
11 that Defendant’s practices were injurious to the public interest because they injured other  
12 persons, had the capacity to injure other persons, and have the capacity to injure other persons.  
13

14           232. Defendant’s failure to safeguard the Private Information exposed in the Data  
15 Breach constitutes an unfair act that offends public policy.

16           233. Defendant’s failure to safeguard the Private Information compromised in the Data  
17 Breach caused substantial injury to Plaintiff and Class Members. Defendant’s failure is not  
18 outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competitors, and it was not  
19 reasonably avoidable by consumers.  
20

21           234. Defendant’s failure to safeguard the Private Information disclosed in the Data  
22 Breach, and its failure to provide timely and complete notice of that Data Breach to the victims,  
23 is unfair because these acts and practices are immoral, unethical, oppressive, and/or  
24 unscrupulous.  
25  
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1           235. In the course of conducting its business, Defendant committed “unfair or  
2 deceptive acts or practices” by, *inter alia*, knowingly failing to design, adopt, implement,  
3 control, direct, oversee, manage, monitor and audit appropriate data security processes, controls,  
4 policies, procedures, protocols, and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect  
5 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information, and violating the common law alleged  
6 herein in the process. Plaintiff and Class Members reserve the right to allege other violations of  
7 law by Defendant constituting other unlawful business acts or practices. As described above,  
8 Defendant’s wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care are ongoing and  
9 continue to this date.  
10

11           236. Defendant also violated the CPA by failing to timely notify, and by concealing  
12 from Plaintiff and Class Members, information regarding the unauthorized release and disclosure  
13 of their Private Information. If Plaintiff and Class Members had been notified in an appropriate  
14 fashion, and had the information not been hidden from them, they could have taken precautions  
15 to safeguard and protect their Private Information.  
16

17           237. Defendant’s above-described wrongful actions, inaction, omissions, want of  
18 ordinary care, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures also constitute “unfair or  
19 deceptive acts or practices” in violation of the CPA in that Defendant’s wrongful conduct is  
20 substantially injurious to other persons, had the capacity to injure other persons, and has the  
21 capacity to injure other persons.  
22

23           238. The gravity of Defendant’s wrongful conduct outweighs any alleged benefits  
24 attributable to such conduct. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendant’s  
25 legitimate business interests other than engaging in the above-described wrongful conduct.  
26  
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1           239. Defendant’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices occurred in its trade or business  
2 and have and injured and are capable of injuring a substantial portion of the public. Defendant’s  
3 general course of conduct as alleged herein is injurious to the public interest, and the acts  
4 complained of herein are ongoing and/or have a substantial likelihood of being repeated.

5           240. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s above-described wrongful  
6 actions, inaction, omissions, and want of ordinary care that directly and proximately caused the  
7 Data Breach and its violations of the CPA, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered, and will  
8 continue to suffer, economic damages and other injury and actual harm in the form of, *inter alia*,  
9 (1) an imminent, immediate and the continuing increased risk of identity theft, identity fraud—  
10 risks justifying expenditures for protective and remedial services for which they are entitled to  
11 compensation; (2) invasion of privacy; (3) breach of the confidentiality of their Private  
12 Information; (4) deprivation of the value of their Private Information, for which there is a well-  
13 established national and international market; and/or (5) the financial and temporal cost of  
14 monitoring credit, monitoring financial accounts, and mitigating damages.  
15

16           241. Unless restrained and enjoined, Defendant will continue to engage in the above-  
17 described wrongful conduct and more data breaches will occur. Plaintiff, therefore, on behalf of  
18 herself and the Class, seek restitution and an injunction prohibiting Defendant from continuing  
19 such wrongful conduct, and requiring Defendant to design, adopt, implement, control, direct,  
20 oversee, manage, monitor and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies,  
21 procedures protocols, and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect the Private  
22 Information entrusted to it.  
23

24           242. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and Class members, also seek to recover actual  
25 damages sustained by each Class member together with the costs of the suit, including reasonable  
26  
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28

1 attorney fees. In addition, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and Class Members, request that this Court  
2 use its discretion, pursuant to RCW 19.86.090, to increase the damages award for each Class  
3 member by three times the actual damages sustained not to exceed \$25,000.00 per Class member.

4 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

5 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and Class Members, requests judgment  
6 against Defendant and that the Court grant the following:  
7

8 A. An order certifying the Class, as defined herein, and appointing Plaintiff and her  
9 Counsel to represent the Class;

10 B. Equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the wrongful conduct  
11 complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of the Private Information of  
12 Plaintiff and Class Members, and from refusing to issue prompt, complete, any accurate  
13 disclosures to Plaintiff and Class Members;  
14

15 C. Injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of  
16 Plaintiff and Class Members, including but not limited to an order:

17 i. prohibiting Defendant from engaging in the wrongful and unlawful acts  
18 described herein;

19 ii. requiring Defendant to protect, including through encryption, all data collected  
20 through the course of its business in accordance with all applicable regulations, industry  
21 standards, and federal, state, or local laws.  
22

23 iii. requiring Defendant to delete, destroy, and purge the personal identifying  
24 information of Plaintiff and Class Members unless Prestige can provide to the Court  
25 reasonable justification for the retention and use of such information when weighed  
26 against the privacy interests of Plaintiff and Class Members;  
27  
28

1           iv. requiring Defendant to implement and maintain a comprehensive Information  
2 Security Program designed to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the Private  
3 Information of Plaintiff and Class Members;

4           v. prohibiting Defendant from maintaining the Private Information of Plaintiff  
5 and Class Members on a cloud-based database;

6           vi. requiring Defendant to engage independent third-party security  
7 auditors/penetration testers as well as internal security personnel to conduct testing,  
8 including simulated attacks, penetration tests, and audits on Defendants systems on a  
9 periodic basis, and ordering Defendant to promptly correct any problems or issues  
10 detected by such third-party security auditors;

11           vii. requiring Defendant to engage independent third-party security auditors and  
12 internal personnel to run automated security monitoring;

13           viii. requiring Defendant to audit, test, and train its security personnel regarding  
14 any new or modified procedures;

15           ix. requiring Defendant to segment data by, among other things, creating  
16 firewalls and access controls so that if one area of Defendant's network is compromised,  
17 hackers cannot gain access to other portions of Defendant's systems;

18           x. requiring Defendant to conduct regular database scanning and securing checks;

19           xi. requiring Defendant to establish an information security training program that  
20 includes at least annual information security training for all employees, with additional  
21 training to be provided as appropriate based upon the employees' respective  
22 responsibilities with handling personal identifying information, as well as protecting the  
23 personal identifying information of Plaintiff and Class Members;  
24  
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1           xii. requiring Defendant to conduct internal training and education routinely and  
2 continually, and on an annual basis to inform internal security personnel how to identify  
3 and contain a breach when it occurs and what to do in response to a breach;

4           xiii. requiring Defendant to implement a system of tests to assess its employees'  
5 knowledge of the education programs discussed in the preceding subparagraphs, as well  
6 as randomly and periodically testing employees' compliance with Defendant's policies,  
7 programs, and systems for protecting personal identifying information;

8           xiv. requiring Defendant to implement, maintain, regularly review, and revise as  
9 necessary a threat management program designed to appropriately monitor Defendant's  
10 information networks for threats, both internal and external, and assess whether  
11 monitoring tools are appropriately configured, tested, and updated;

12           xv. requiring Defendant to meaningfully educate all Class Members about the  
13 threats that they face as a result of the loss of their Private Information to third parties, as  
14 well as the steps affected individuals must take to protect Themselves;

15           xvi. requiring Defendant to implement logging and monitoring programs  
16 sufficient to track traffic to and from Defendant's servers; and

17           xvii. for a period of 10 years, appointing a qualified and independent third-party  
18 assessor to conduct a SOC 2 Type 2 attestation on an annual basis to evaluate Defendant's  
19 compliance with the terms of the Court's final judgment, to provide such report to the  
20 Court and to counsel for the class, and to report any deficiencies with compliance of the  
21 Court's final judgment;  
22  
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1 D. An award of damages, including actual, statutory, nominal, and  
2 consequential damages, as allowed by law in an amount to be  
3 determined;

4 E. An award of attorneys' fees, costs, and litigation expenses, as  
5 allowed by law;

6 F. Prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded; and

7 G. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

8  
9 **JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

10 Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all claims so triable.

11  
12 Dated: February 16, 2024

Respectfully Submitted,

13  
14 **TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC**

15 By: s/Kaleigh N. Boyd  
16 Kaleigh N. Boyd, WSBA No. 52684  
17 1200 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1700  
18 Seattle, WA 98101  
19 Telephone: 206-682-5600  
20 Facsimile: 206-682-2992  
21 kboyd@tousley.com

22 Gary M. Klinger\*  
23 **MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON**  
24 **PHILLIPS GROSSMAN LLC**  
25 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100  
26 Chicago, IL 60606  
27 Phone: (866) 252-0878  
28 gklinger@milberg.com

*Attorneys for Plaintiff and  
Proposed Class Counsel*

*\*Pro Hac Vice application forthcoming*

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

DONNA BRIM, on behalf of herself individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

(b) Clackamas County, OR (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Kaleigh N. Boyd of Tousley Brain Stephens, PLLC. 1200 5th Ave, Ste 1700, Seattle, WA 98101

DEFENDANTS

PRESTIGE CARE, INC.

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff, 2 U.S. Government Defendant, 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party), 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

- Citizen of This State, Citizen of Another State, Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country, PTF DEF, 1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4 4, 5 5, 6 6

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.

Table with columns: CONTRACT, REAL PROPERTY, CIVIL RIGHTS, TORTS, PRISONER PETITIONS, FORFEITURE/PENALTY, LABOR, IMMIGRATION, BANKRUPTCY, SOCIAL SECURITY, FEDERAL TAX SUITS, OTHER STATUTES. Includes various legal categories like Personal Injury, Contract, Real Property, etc.

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 Original Proceeding, 2 Removed from State Court, 3 Remanded from Appellate Court, 4 Reinstated or Reopened, 5 Transferred from Another District, 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer, 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): 28 U.S.C. 1332

Brief description of cause: Data Breach class action

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. DEMAND \$ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions): JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER

DATE February 16, 2024 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD s/Kaleigh N. Boyd

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44**

## Authority For Civil Cover Sheet

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

- I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants.** Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then the official, giving both name and title.
- (b) County of Residence.** For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
- (c) Attorneys.** Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)".
- II. Jurisdiction.** The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X" in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.  
 United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here. United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.  
 Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.  
 Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; **NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity cases.**)
- III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties.** This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this section for each principal party.
- IV. Nature of Suit.** Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If there are multiple nature of suit codes associated with the case, pick the nature of suit code that is most applicable. Click here for: [Nature of Suit Code Descriptions](#).
- V. Origin.** Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes.  
 Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.  
 Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441.  
 Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing date.  
 Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.  
 Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or multidistrict litigation transfers.  
 Multidistrict Litigation – Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407.  
 Multidistrict Litigation – Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket.  
**PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7.** Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to changes in statute.
- VI. Cause of Action.** Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. **Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.** Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service.
- VII. Requested in Complaint.** Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.  
 Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.  
 Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
- VIII. Related Cases.** This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.

**Date and Attorney Signature.** Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Western District of Washington

DONNA BRIM, on behalf of herself individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated

Plaintiff(s)

v.

PRESTIGE CARE, INC.

Defendant(s)

Civil Action No.

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant's name and address) PRESTIGE CARE, INC.
c/o COGENCY GLOBAL INC, Registered Agent
1780 BARNES BLVD SW
TUMWATER, WA, 98512-0410

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney,
whose name and address are:
Kaleigh N. Boyd
Tousley Brain Stephens PLLC
1200 5th Ave, Suite 1700
Seattle, WA 98101
kboyd@tousley.com

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

CLERK OF COURT

Date:

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

Civil Action No. \_\_\_\_\_

**PROOF OF SERVICE**

*(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))*

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* \_\_\_\_\_  
was received by me on *(date)* \_\_\_\_\_ .

I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ on *(date)* \_\_\_\_\_ ; or

I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,  
on *(date)* \_\_\_\_\_ , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

I served the summons on *(name of individual)* \_\_\_\_\_ , who is  
designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ on *(date)* \_\_\_\_\_ ; or

I returned the summons unexecuted because \_\_\_\_\_ ; or

Other *(specify)*: \_\_\_\_\_

My fees are \$ \_\_\_\_\_ for travel and \$ \_\_\_\_\_ for services, for a total of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ 0.00 \_\_\_\_\_ .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Server's signature*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Printed name and title*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Server's address*

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: